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 LAW REVIEW 
I. FICTIONAL CHARACTERS AND THE LAW 
After 127 years of providing detective consulting services, in 
2014, Sherlock Holmes faced his toughest case yet: “The Mystery 
of the Public Domain.” In that case, the Seventh Circuit was asked 
to balance the competing interests of the estate of the Sherlock 
Holmes creator with the interests of authors to use the character in 
new fictional works.1 Utilizing the existing body of case law on the 
subject, the court deduced that Arthur Conan Doyle and his estate 
had exploited the Holmes character as far as copyright law allows, 
setting Holmes up for new adventures in the public domain.2 
American intellectual property law is designed to incentivize 
authors to create new literary, artistic, and other works of 
authorship; and thus add to America’s rich and ever-growing 
popular culture. To achieve this objective, copyright law, and in 
fact, the Constitution, affords authors certain exclusive rights in 
their copyrighted works, including to the original characters 
contained therein, so that the authors can secure a fair return on 
their efforts.3 At the same time, the law limits a character owner’s 
monopoly by (i) limiting the protection afforded to characters to 
only those that are fully developed; (ii) allowing others to create 
and exploit similar, but non-infringing, characters that share 
common traits and stock or genre characteristics; (iii) permitting 
third parties to make fair uses of characters; and (iv) ensuring that 
the copyright in protected characters will eventually expire, 
injecting such characters into the public domain. While character 
owners have an assortment of legal tools available to protect their 
work, these legal tools are not absolute; the public can utilize 
characters owned by others without the need to secure rights from 
the owners by way of devices like the fair use doctrine and free 
speech rights.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014). 
2 Id. at 503. 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Character owners and new creators should familiarize 
themselves with the legal protections afforded to fictional 
characters. To best exploit and protect a character over time, 
character creators should consider legal protections while 
conceiving and designing characters. New creators should 
understand how existing characters might impact their ability to 
create and exploit new ones that are similar to, or reminiscent of, 
those existing characters. On the other hand, creators and owners 
of existing characters should be aware of the limits on their 
exclusive rights, so that they can avoid wasting energy and 
resources taking meritless actions against perceived infringers.  
This article explains the legal protections available to 
characters, and the limitations on character owners’ exclusive 
rights. Part II provides an overview of the laws available to protect 
fictional characters. Sections III through V examine specific 
examples of how various laws have been applied to fictional 
characters. Section VI addresses the limitations on character 
owners’ rights, and explores the ways in which characters or their 
constituent elements may be freely used without permission. 
Finally, section VII offers tips on protecting characters within 
existing legal parameters. 
II. LEGAL BASIS FOR PROTECTING CHARACTERS 
Copyright law provides exclusive rights for creative works, 
including fictional characters that are (1) original, and (2) fixed in 
a tangible medium.4 Cases construing the meaning of “originality” 
generally have required it to mean “independent creation plus a 
modicum of creativity.”5 The creativity bar is not high.6 Moreover, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see Balt. Orioles v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the statutory 
definition of “fixed” in 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
5 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991). 
6 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Balt. Orioles, 805 F. 2d at 669 
n.7; L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F. 2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[T]he 
quantum of originality that is required may be modest indeed . . . .”). 
5
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while “some original expression” is required, the original 
expression contributed to a work need not be separable from the 
work as a whole.7  
The goal of copyright is to promote the progress of the arts8 
and consequently enrich the public.9 This goal is accomplished by 
giving creators an incentive to create by allowing them certain 
exclusive rights for limited periods of time.10 By limiting the 
duration of copyright,11 the public’s interest in an ever-growing, 
rich public domain is balanced with the interests of creators. By 
affording copyright owners protection in their works, copyright 
law also benefits the public by encouraging authors to produce 
original works. It is not designed to let creators avoid “the 
drudgery of working up something fresh” by simply copying 
existing works.12  
Trademark law protects any word, name, symbol, or device 
that is used to identify the source or origin of a product.13 Thus, to 
the extent that any character indicia function to identify the source 
or origin of a product or service, such character indicia may be 
entitled to trademark protection.14 While exclusive trademark 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Gaiman v. MacFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658 (7th Cir. 2004). 
8 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
9 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012); Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Mazur v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
10 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 902 (citing Sony Corp. and Mazur in support of 
the proposition that the limited copyright conferred by copyright is meant to 
motivate authors to create).  
11 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
12 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
14 See Sony v. Fireworks, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
(holding that where plaintiffs could not define to what they were claiming 
trademark rights, nor that the character had acquired secondary meaning as a 
source identifier, the court could not assess whether there was a likelihood of 
confusion between plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks to find trademark 
infringement by the defendants), vacated, 2002 WL 32387901 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
!
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rights protect owners by encouraging them to invest in the 
goodwill attendant with their marks, trademark law is rooted in 
consumer protection.15 Just as consumers buy any trademarked 
goods based on the goodwill of the applicable trademark, the 
public consumes entertainment products based on the brands 
associated with such products. 
The goal of trademark law is to protect “the purchasing public 
from confusing desired product with similarly named, labeled, or 
branded product from a different source.”16 Trademark law also 
gives trademark owners the incentive to invest in the establishment 
of brand names and marks, and to maintain high levels of quality 
control over their products and services.17 Trademark law can thus 
“contribute to a favorable climate for expression by complementing 
the economic incentive that copyright provides to create and 
disseminate artistic works.”18 Unlike copyright, trademark rights 
may persist indefinitely as long as the trademark owner continues 
to use its mark. However, merely registering an image of a 
character as a trademark does not give the registrant perpetual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Where a character, or its name, is not inherently distinctive, and it is not 
otherwise protected as a registered trademark, it may still be entitled to 
trademark protection if it has acquired “secondary meaning” such that the 
consuming public would associate any third party’s use of those elements with 
the source or origin of the entertainment property from which those elements 
were derived. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 
F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979).  
15 James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th 
Cir. 1976) (“The trademark laws exist not to ‘protect’ trademarks, but. . . to 
protect the consuming public from confusion, concomitantly protecting the 
trademark owner’s right to a non-confused public.”).  
16 Mechanical Plastics Corp. v. Titan Techs., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
17 Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir 
1985); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Freuhauf, 536 F.2d. 1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 
1976). 
18 Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1989). 
7
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rights in the image.19 It is not the recognition of a character image 
that provides perpetual rights in that image. Rather, it is the 
character owner’s continued use of that image as a source identifier 
that allows the image to receive trademark protection indefinitely.20 
Copyright protection in a character, in contrast, continues for the 
duration of the copyright term regardless of whether the copyright 
owner continues to exploit the work. Copyright owners can let 
their works go out of print or elect not to publish or license any 
third parties to publish any new works using a character, and still 
preserve copyright protection for that character. Trademark law, on 
the other hand, requires that a trademark owner continually convey 
its character to the public to maintain trademark rights in that 
character. 
Another proprietary right that may protect characters from 
unauthorized use is the right of publicity. Every person, whether 
famous or not, has a property right in her name and likeness. Some 
people become famous because of characters they portray or 
personas they adopt, and the name and likeness of that character or 
persona can have substantial value. Unlike copyright and 
trademark law, rights of publicity are state-based (both statutory 
and common law), and therefore not uniform throughout the 
country. Generally, the laws prohibit the unauthorized use of a 
person’s name or likeness for commercial purposes.21 As opposed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d. 1042, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, 
J., concurring). 
20 See id. at 1052. 
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (“One who 
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without 
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of 
trade is subject to liability . . . .”); Id. § 47 (1995) (“The name, likeness, and 
other indicia of a person’s identity are used “for purposes of trade” . . . . if they 
are used in advertising the user’s goods or services, or are placed on 
merchandise marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services 
rendered by the user. However, use “for purposes of trade” does not ordinarily 
include the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, commentary, 
!
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to the right of privacy, which protects a person’s feelings, a 
person’s right of publicity gives the exclusive right to control the 
commercial exploitation of her name and likeness.22 Often invoked 
as a complement to trademark rights, right of publicity laws have 
been used by individuals to prohibit others from commercially 
exploiting characters or personas that they portray. Moreover, right 
of publicity claims will not be preempted by copyright or 
trademark laws if such claims address rights different from those 
protected by copyright and trademark, such as persona or 
likeness.23 
III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF CHARACTERS 
Copyright provides exclusive protection for original works of 
authorship fixed in a tangible medium.24 The law does not grant a 
monopoly over mere ideas, themes, or concepts; which are in the 
public domain and available to everyone.25 In order to gain 
exclusive copyright in a character, character creators must not only 
create original works, but must also flesh out their characters with 
enough original expression to make them distinctive.26 Courts have 
therefore developed tests to determine whether a character has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental 
to such uses.”).  
22 Haelan Lab. Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d 
Cir. 1953) (recognizing property right in a baseball player’s photograph used on 
trading cards). 
23 See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 
115571, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1995). 
24 17 U.S.C. §102 (2012) (corresponding to the language of the Copyright 
Act of 1909 Act, § 3) (“That the copyright provided by this title shall protect all 
the copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted . . . .”). 
25 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 
1992) (explaining that copyright does not confer a monopoly over the 
underlying idea or functional principle, as that is the domain under the more 
stringent standards imposed by patent laws).  
26 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
9
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reached a level of distinction to grant exclusive rights to the unique 
compilation of the character’s traits.  
In the 1930 case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures, the Ninth 
Circuit employed the now oft-cited “sufficiently delineated” test.27 
Pursuant to this test, if an author has imbued the character with 
sufficient original details, the character will be entitled to some 
level of protection.28 The more highly developed the character, the 
greater the protection available. In Nichols, the court found that the 
plaintiff’s characters were not sufficiently developed and thus not 
copyrightable because they were merely archetypal characters that 
often appeared in literature.29 In his opinion, Judge Learned Hand 
warned would-be plaintiffs that “[t]he less developed a character in 
a play is, the less it can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an 
author must bear for marking them too indistinctly.”30  
Another well-known judicial test for the copyrightability of 
characters is the “story being told” test that originated in the 
Second Circuit in 1954. In Warner Bros. v. Columbia Broadcast 
Systems, the court found that a character could only be the subject 
of copyright protection where the character constituted “the story 
being told.”31 Pursuant to this test, the character must be more than 
a “mere vehicle” for the telling of the story, and must actually be 
the “story being told.”32 Taking a more restrictive view of the 
copyrightability of a character apart from the work in which he 
appears, the court here reasoned that because “[t]he characters of 
an author’s imagination and the art of his descriptive talent . . . are 
always limited and always fall into limited patterns,” allowing one 
author to claim a monopoly over that character would violate 
copyright law’s goal of promoting the useful arts unless the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 See id. at 121. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 122–23. 
30 Id. at 121. 
31 See 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954). 
32 Id. 
10
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character constitutes the story.33 In that case the court found that 
Sam Spade was merely the vehicle for telling the The Maltese 
Falcon story, and thus not copyrightable.34  
 Most courts have declined to follow Warner Brothers, 
suggesting that the proposed “story being told” test was dictum.35 
Others have reasoned that while the “story being told” test may 
apply to literary characters, it is inapplicable to visual characters.36 
Still others have held that, if the test was ever good law, it is no 
longer.37 Other courts have applied elements from each of the 
foregoing tests, looking both at how developed a character is, and 
the character’s role in the work in which it appears.38 In Anderson 
v. Stallone, the court held that the characters from the first three 
films from the Rocky motion picture series were among “the most 
highly delineated characters in modern American cinema, and 
were so highly developed and central to the films that they 
constituted the story being told.”39 A few years later, in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer v. American Honda, the same court found that the 
James Bond character was both sufficiently delineated and the 
story being told throughout the sixteen films in which he had 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Id. at 950. 
34 Id. In that case, the holding that the character was not protectable under 
copyright law actually favored the character’s creator who wished to use the 
character in new works after granting exclusive rights to the work in which the 
character first appeared to a movie studio. Id.  
35 See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1165(C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
36 See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004); Walt Disney 
Prods., 581 F.2d at 755; Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1165.  
37 Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1165 (“Subsequent decisions in the Ninth 
Circuit cast doubt on the reasoning and implicitly limit the holding of the Sam 
Spade case.”); Gaiman at 660 (“The Ninth Circuit has killed the decision, 
though without the usual obsequies.”). 
38 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. American Honda, 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. 
Cal. 1995); Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1166. 
39 Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1166 (emphasis added).  
11
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appeared, such that the character was deserving of copyright 
protection.40  
A. Literary Characters Versus Visual Characters 
Not all characters qualify for copyright protection, and not all 
characters are treated equally under the law. Pursuant to any 
judicial test, characters lacking distinctive, original traits or an 
original combination of distinctive traits have been found to be 
uncopyrightable.41 Also, while purely literary characters might be 
protectable, visual characters (such as comic or cartoon characters) 
are easier to protect, as their visual embodiments are entitled to 
protection independent of their literary attributes. This is not to say 
that characters developed solely by “word portraits”42 are not 
entitled to protection. They certainly are, but identifying the 
protectable elements of purely literary characters presents 
challenges not applicable to visual characters.43 In a recent Seventh 
Circuit case, the court was asked to consider all the protectable 
traits of the Sherlock Holmes and John Watson characters from an 
entire series of books and stories.44 It found that those characters 
were distinctive enough to be proper subjects of copyright 
independent of the stories in which they appeared.45 While 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F. Supp. at 1296. 
41 See Olson v. National Broad. Co., 855 F. 2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988). 
42 1 MELVIN NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (Matthew Bender rev. 
ed. 2014). 
43 See Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1165 (“As a practical matter, a 
graphically depicted character is much more likely than a literary character to be 
fleshed out in sufficient detail so as to warrant copyright protection.”); Walt 
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (“While many 
literary characters may embody little more than an unprotected idea… a comic 
book character, which has physical as well as conceptual qualities, is more likely 
to contain some unique elements of expression.”). 
44 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(“From the outset of the series of Arthur Conan Doyle stories and novels that 
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multiple appearances may aid in the development of the character, 
they are not required for a court to find that a literary character is 
developed enough to be copyrightable. A district court in Washington 
had no difficulty in concluding that an anthropomorphized seagull 
appearing in one book was both sufficiently delineated and the 
story being told, and therefore copyrightable.46 But characters 
lacking visual depiction that are only described in a few lines will 
likely not be developed enough to be copyrightable.47 
In the case where a character is solely described in writing, the 
reader must necessarily use imagination to create a vision of the 
character in the mind. Each reader therefore could have a different 
interpretation of the elements combined to create the character, 
making it difficult to define what makes the character developed. 
Where a character has a visual representation, however, all viewers 
receive a uniform interpretation of the character.48 The Ninth 
Circuit in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates asserted that 
visual characters should not be subject to the Second Circuit’s 
stringent test applicable to literary characters.49 It reasoned that the 
physical and conceptual qualities of a comic book character, 
apparent through its visual representation, are more likely to be a 
unique expression.50 The court then held that Disney’s famous 
graphic characters were protected by copyright and infringed by 
the defendants when they placed the innocent characters in “adult” 
situations.51  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (W.D. 
Wash. 2007). C.f. Rice v. Fox, 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
magician is dressed in standard magician garb—black tuxedo with tails, a white 
tuxedo shirt, a black bow tie, and a black cape with red lining—and his role is 
limited to performing and revealing the magic tricks.”). 
47 See Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F. 2d 1446, 1452–53 (9th Cir. 1988). 
48 See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 at 660–61 (7th Cir. 2004). 
49 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).  
50 Id. at 755. 
51 Id. at 755–56 
13
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The court in Anderson v. Stallone found that the defendant’s 
script treatment for a fourth Rocky film was a “bodily 
appropriation” of the characters portrayed in the first three Rocky 
films—and an infringement.52 In its opinion, the court evaluated 
the judicial tests for copyrightability of characters and noted that 
"[a]s a practical matter, a graphically depicted character is much 
more likely than a literary character to be fleshed out in sufficient 
detail so as to warrant copyright protection."53 Reasoning that the 
detail with which the characters were developed in the first three 
films delineated the characters more than sufficiently, and that the 
characters—as opposed to the plots—are what drove the three 
Rocky films, the court found the Rocky characters copyrightable 
under both tests.54 Similarly, the court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. 
American Honda had to determine whether James Bond was a 
copyrightable character separate from the works in which he 
appeared.55 Noting that the law in the Ninth Circuit was unclear as 
to which test should be applied to a visual character such as James 
Bond, the court elected to analyze the copyrightability of Bond 
under both tests.56 Because the character as portrayed in each of 
plaintiffs’ sixteen Bond movies displayed such specific traits—“his 
cold-bloodedness; his overt sexuality; his love of martinis ‘shaken, 
not stirred;’ his marksmanship; his ‘license to kill’ . . . .”—James 
Bond was more than sufficiently delineated.57 Moreover, because 
these character traits remained consistent throughout the sixteen 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 1174. 
55 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
56 Id. at 1296–97. 
57 Id. at 1296; see also Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co. 33 F. Supp. 2d 
1206, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Toho’s Godzilla is a well-defined character with 
highly delineated consistent traits. Therefore, Toho has demonstrated prima 
facie ownership of copyrights in the Godzilla character apart from any film.”). 
14
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films even though the character was played by multiple actors, the 
stories really were about the James Bond character.58 
B. Component Parts of Characters Can Be Separately 
Copyrightable 
While the collection of specific traits of a character can be 
copyrightable, original, individual components of a character’s 
identity may also be protected by copyright. In New Line Cinema 
v. Russ Berrie, the court found that the glove worn by Freddy 
Krueger in the Nightmare on Elm Street films was protectable by 
copyright on its own.59 The court in that case opined that where the 
component part of a character protected by copyright so helps to 
identify the character, that part, even when separated from the rest 
of the character, remains protected by copyright.60 Recently, a 
court held that the Batmobile was a copyrighted character.61 In DC 
Comics v. Towle, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
the Batmobile is not protectable by copyright because it is a useful 
item—a car—holding on alternative bases that: (1) the Batmobile 
is a copyrighted character because it displays “a series of readily 
identifiable and distinguishing traits . . . [it is] recognizable 
because it contains bat-like motifs, such as a bat-faced grill or bat-
shaped tailfins in the rear of the car, and it is almost always jet 
black;”62 and (2) the separately identifiable creative elements 
incorporated into the Batmobile that are capable of existing 
independently from the utilitarian aspects of the car are protectable 
as pictorial, graphic and sculptural works.63 The original, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, 900 F. Supp. at 1296; see also William 
Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 (“While Godzilla may have shifted from 
evil to good, there remains an underlying set of attributes that remain in every 
film.”). 
59 161 F. Supp. 2d 293, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
60 Id. 
61 DC Comics v. Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d 948 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
62 Id. at 967.  
63 Id. at 968.  
15
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consistent features of the design of the car are what make it 
recognizable as a character.  
C. Stock Characters Are Not Copyrightable 
Characters lacking originality, however, will not be protected 
by copyright. Stock characters, archetypes, and characters lacking 
unique expression, cannot be monopolized under copyright law.64 
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. described the “spectrum” of 
copyright protection for characters.65 On one end are scènes à 
faire:66 “stock scenes and hackneyed character types,” which are 
not protectable because they contain no unique aspects.67 However, 
as characters become more idiosyncratic, they eventually cross the 
line into “expression” and are protected by copyright.68 A character 
that in its early stages was merely a stock character can be fleshed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 See e.g., DiTocco v. Riordan, 815 F. Supp. 2d 655, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“Young male heroes who must cope with missing parents and display their 
strength in battles with otherworldly forces are commonplace.”). For further 
examples of characters which are not protected, see Walker v. Time Life Films, 
Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that scènes à faire, which have 
been described as “scenes that necessarily result from the choice of a setting or 
situation” are not copyrightable.); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 
F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (providing more examples of scènes à faire such as 
“incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, 
or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic”) (internal quotation 
omitted); Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 
1976) (holding that “thematic concepts . . . which necessarily must follow from 
certain similar plot situations” are not copyrightable).  
65 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
66 French translation for “scenes of action.” See also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“Standard or general themes that are common to a 
wide variety of works and therefore not copyrightable.”).  
67 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1266. 
68 Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Prod., Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977) (Explaining that there 
is no infringement if only the ideas from a work are copied because ideas 
receive no copyright protection. “To constitute infringement the copying must 
reach the point of ‘unlawful appropriation,’ or the copying of the protected 
expression itself.”). 
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out enough to bring it into “copyright land.”69 Once the character 
embodies an “original arrangement of incidents and literary 
expressions,” and does not merely describe a type of character, the 
character may be protected by copyright.70 In Detective Comics v. 
Bruns, the court acknowledged that copyright does not extend to 
“archetypal” elements such as the idea or premise of a “Superman” 
who is a blessing to mankind. But while the underlying premise for 
the “benevolent Hercules” type character is not protectable, other 
elements, such as incredible feats, characterizations (such as 
employment and secret identities), and unique antics are.71 
IV. PROTECTION OF CHARACTERS THROUGH TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
A. Trademark Rights Are Separate from Copyrights 
Because trademark and copyright principles apply to and 
protect different aspects of a creative work and are not mutually 
dependent, trademark rights in a character may be owned and 
enforced even if the trademark owner does not own the copyright 
in the character.72 For example, in Tri-star Pictures, Inc. v. Del 
Taco, Inc., even though the plaintiff did not own any copyrights in 
the “Zorro” character, it was not barred from bringing a trademark 
infringement claim when the defendant sought to use Zorro-related 
indicia to promote its restaurant chain.73 Trademark law offers 
character owners protections independent of copyright law, which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004). 
70 Detective Comics v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432, 433–34 (2d Cir. 1940); 
see Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659 (discussing the court’s analysis in the Detective 
Comics case). The author’s verbal description of a comic book character is an 
uncopyrightable stock character. Id. at 661. However, once the character is 
“drawn and named and given speech, he be[comes] sufficiently delineated to be 
copyrightable.” Id. 
71 See id. at 433–34. 
72 See, e.g., Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989); Fleischer 
Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1153–54 (C.D. Cal. 
2008), aff’d, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011); Tri-star Pictures, Inc. v. Del Taco, 
Inc., 1999 WL 33260839 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
73 See Tri-star, 1999 WL 33260839, at *2–4. 
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can be exercised by the owner of a character notwithstanding that 
any copyright in the character may have expired.74 
B. Character Elements Must Act as Source Identifiers 
Just as copyright law does not protect all elements of a 
character, not all character elements are protectable by trademark 
law. Only those elements of a character that assist the public in 
associating the character with a specific source may receive 
trademark protection.75 A character’s name may be a protectable 
component of a character under trademark law.76 In Wyatt Earp 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., the court held that the plaintiff 
had established secondary meaning and hence trademark rights in 
the “Wyatt Earp” name even though Wyatt Earp was a real person 
of historic significance.77 The court recognized that the 
commercial value of the character’s name was attributable almost 
entirely to a television program produced by the plaintiff along 
with the plaintiff’s extensive licensing program, which “battered 
[the name] into the public consciousness.”78 The secondary 
meaning in the Wyatt Earp name generated by the plaintiff’s use of 
the name allowed the plaintiff to stop the licensee from selling and 
promoting Wyatt Earp costumes after its license had expired.79 The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Id. at *3–4. See generally Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc. v. Fireworks Entm’t 
Grp., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
75 DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[W]here the product sold by plaintiff is ‘entertainment’ in 
one form or another, then not only the advertising of the product but also an 
ingredient of the product itself can amount to a trademark protectable under § 
43(a) because the ingredient can come to symbolize the plaintiff or its product in 
the public mind.”). 
76 E.g. Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 Fed.2d 145 (5th 
Cir. 1985); Am. Broad. Co. Merch., Inc. v. Button World Mfg., Inc., 1966 WL 
7657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Wyatt Earp Enters., Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. 
Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
77 Wyatt Earp, 157 F. Supp. at 623–625. 
78 Id. at 624. 
79 Id. at 627. 
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court found that defendant’s use of the Wyatt Earp name on 
children’s play costumes would very likely cause the consuming 
public to believe that the costumes came from the plaintiff because 
of the goodwill contributed to the Wyatt Earp name through the 
plaintiff’s radio and television shows.80  
In a case construing the related doctrine of unfair competition, 
the court in Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox enjoined the defendants from 
using any language that could be construed by the public as 
suggesting a connection between defendant’s circus and the “Lone 
Ranger” name.81 The court held that the Lone Ranger name was 
the trade name under which plaintiff producers’ radio program was 
distributed.82 Plaintiff had engendered good will in the Lone 
Ranger name, and by using the title “the Original Lone Ranger” for 
a performer in its circus—an obvious attempt to trade off 
plaintiff’s good will in the Lone Ranger name—the defendants had 
fraudulently appropriated that good will.83 
Costumes worn by characters can also qualify for trademark 
protection,84 and the unauthorized use of a character’s costume can 
falsely suggest a connection between the unauthorized user and the 
character owner.85 The issue in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. 
Pussycat Cinemas was whether the plaintiff owned a trademark in 
the unique costumes worn by its cheerleaders.86 The court found 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Id. at 625. 
81 Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 1942). 
82 Id. 
83 See id.; see also Button World Mfg. 1966 WL 7657 at *1 (enjoining 
defendant from “using the very name which plaintiffs have popularized and 
which is associated in the public mind with their broadcasting programs.”). 
84 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 
200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979). 
85 See Brown v. It’s Entm’t, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(granting preliminary injunction against defendant renting infringing “Arthur the 
Aardvark” costume); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Rooding, 1989 WL 76149 at *3-*4 
(N.D. Ill. 1989). 
86 Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 203–04. 
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that plaintiff’s “combination of the white boots, white shorts, blue 
blouse, and white star-studded vest and belt is an arbitrary design 
which makes the otherwise functional uniform trademarkable.”87 
In Warner Bros. Inc. v. Rooding, the court enjoined the owner of a 
movie theater from jumping out of a helicopter wearing a Batman 
costume on the day of the release of the Batman movie.88 The 
timing and advertising for the stunt demonstrated to the court 
defendant’s obvious intention to exploit plaintiff’s trademarks “in 
the form of a Batman costume.”89 In Brown v. It’s Entertainment, 
Inc., the plaintiff owners of the “Arthur the Aardvark” character 
sought to enjoin the defendant’s unauthorized commercial use of 
an unlicensed “Arthur” costume.90 The court found “Arthur,” a 
stylized Aardvark with the persona of a schoolboy, to be an 
inherently distinctive, and as the evidence showed, a famous 
trademark.91 
Other indicia, such as a prop, well-known saying, or slogan, of 
a character can be protected by trademark if it is so connected to 
the character so as to identify the character’s source.92 Bugs 
Bunny’s “What’s up, doc?”93 and “E.T. phone home”94 are trademarks. 
In Lone Ranger v. Cox, the court found defendant’s use of the 
familiar call of plaintiff’s character—“Hi Ho Silver!”—in its circus 
served to accentuate defendant’s deceptive use of the Lone Ranger 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Id. at 204. 
88 Rooding, 1989 WL 76149 at *3; see also id. at *4 (explaining how the 
injunction applied only to the defendant’s commercial use of the costume, 
explicitly permitting him to wear it for “a walk down the beach . . . [h]anding 
out free candy at orphanages . . . .”). 
89 Id. at *3. 
90 Brown v. It’s Entertainment, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854 (E.D.N.Y 1999). 
91 Id. at 858–59. 
92 See supra note 75 (discussing protectability of an “ingredient” of an 
entertainment product). 
93 WHAT’S UP, DOC?, Registration No. 75,844,359. 
94 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162 
(S.D. Tex. 1982). 
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character.95 Holding that the familiar coloring and symbols on the 
“General Lee” had attainted secondary meaning, the court in 
Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys concluded that defendant’s unauthorized 
toy cars were likely to confuse consumers into believing that the 
infringing cars originated with the creators of the Dukes of 
Hazzard.96  
C. Distinctive Visual Representations Are Protectable by 
Trademark Law. 
Visual representations of characters are also protectable under 
trademark law. For example, defendant’s chain of pizza restaurants 
named “Conans Pizza,” and whose “menus, signs, promotional 
materials, and general décor featured a barbarian-like man who 
closely resembled” plaintiff’s “Conan the Barbarian” character was 
found to have infringed the image of the trademarked character.97 
At trial, the jury found it likely that “the pervasive, inescapable 
aura of Conan the Barbarian” present at the restaurants could lead 
consumers to conclude that the restaurants were associated with 
the plaintiff owners of the “Conan the Barbarian” character.”98 In 
DC Comics v. Filmation, the court compared defendant’s “Manta,” 
“Moray,” and “Superstretch” characters to plaintiff’s “Aquaman” 
and “Plastic Man” characters and found that the similarity of the 
physical appearances and costumes of the defendant’s characters 
were likely to cause confusion among consumers as to whether 
such characters were associated with plaintiff, thereby 
demonstrating trademark infringement and unfair competition.99 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 652 (4th Cir. 1942). 
96 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 333 (2d Cir. 1983). 
97 Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 
1985); id. at 155 (holding that plaintiff owns protectable rights in the Conan the 
Barbarian name and character). 
98 Id. at 150. 
99 See DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
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D. General Traits Are Not Protected by Trademark 
While a competitor’s use of an existing character’s distinctive 
elements may cause confusion as to the source of the competing 
character, the use of similar, common character traits will not. The 
owner of a character will not be able to use trademark law to claim 
exclusive rights in the general traits and abilities of its character, 
just as it cannot use copyright law to claim exclusive rights in the 
stock elements contained in the character.100 Because there are 
infinite potential manifestations of personality traits and physical 
abilities in a character, each can never be consistent enough to 
serve as a single source identifier, and therefore cannot be 
protected by trademark law.101 For example, in American 
Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., the court found that in 
selling its stuffed bears with messages displayed on their chests, 
the defendant may have capitalized on the enhanced demand for 
stuffed bears arising from the 75th anniversary of the teddy bear, 
but it had not infringed on any trademark rights plaintiffs held in 
their “Care Bears” stuffed bears which also bore symbols on their 
chests.102   
V. PROTECTION OF CHARACTERS THROUGH RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
Separate from, and in addition to, copyrights and trademark 
rights, the character persona adopted by an actor or other celebrity 
may be protectable by rights of publicity.103 The right of publicity 
gives a celebrity portraying a character or other famous persona the 
right to control the exploitation of her “identity.”104 The “identity” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 Id. at 1277. 
101 Id. 
102 Am. Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 617 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
103 Although the case law typically involves the rights of publicity of 
famous people, non-celebrities hold this property right as well. 
104 See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 
(6th Cir. 1983). Note that most state laws provide rights of publicity for living 
persons only. Some states do provide post-mortem rights of publicity. New York 
!
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of a character or other persona may be a name, image, signature, 
general appearance, or even voice. In Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s ruling that plaintiffs’ 
rights of publicity were not violated because no reasonable jury 
could find that three dimensional robots resembling television 
characters played by plaintiffs looked enough like plaintiffs to 
violate their rights of publicity.105 The appeals court held that it 
was the physical likenesses of the actors that had value to the 
defendant, and regardless of plaintiff’s lack of copyright ownership 
in the “Norm” and “Cliff” characters they played on television, a 
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant’s robots 
appropriated the actors’ likenesses.106 Accordingly, the use of 
likenesses of actors who portray copyrighted characters on 
television may violate their rights of publicity and constitute false 
endorsements if the resemblance is to the actors themselves, and 
not just characteristics unique to the copyrighted characters that 
they played.107  
A celebrity’s identity can also include a signature saying, 108 his 
name or nickname,109 or his car.110 These identity elements can be 
misappropriated by a commercial user even without the use of the 
celebrity’s likeness.111 An actor’s claim that his right of publicity 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
does not recognize a post-mortem right of publicity, but California provides 
seventy years post-mortem right of publicity that is descendible and transferable. 
Compare N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (Consol. 2000) with CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 3344.1 (f)–(h) (2012). 
105 Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997). 
106 Id. at 811 (stating actors do not lose the right to control the commercial 
exploitation of their identities simply by portraying fictional characters). 
107 Id. at 812. 
108 See Carson v. Here’s Johnny, 698 F.2d at 832, 836 (“Here’s Johnny”). 
109 See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“the 
Greatest”). 
110 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822, 
827 (9th Cir. 1974) (image of famous race car driver’s car with a solid red body 
and a distinctive narrow white pinstripe on the leading edge). 
111 See infra notes 142–44. 
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has been violated by the commercialization, without his consent, of 
the character he portrays will only lie if the accused character 
evokes the persona of the actor.112 Where it is not an actual 
person’s identity being exploited, but only the character he 
portrays, it is likely there will be no violation of a right of 
publicity.113 
VI. LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE USE 
Even if a person or entity owns copyrights and trademarks in a 
character, there are limitations on that person or entity’s exclusive 
use of the character. Not all uses of existing characters, 
copyrightable elements, or character indicia infringe on any party’s 
exclusive rights. Not only will the copyrightable elements of 
characters all eventually enter the public domain after a limited 
time, but all characters, even while still eligible for copyright 
protection or entitled to trademark protection or protectable under 
one’s right of publicity, may be used in new works in certain 
circumstances without violating the rights of the character rights 
holder. These exceptions to an owner’s monopoly over a character, 
discussed below, ensure a proper balance between the exclusive 
rights of character owners and the rights of the public and new 
creators to use existing characters. 
A. Non-infringing Uses—Copyright 
It is typically the challenge of an infringement action that 
determines whether a character is protected by copyright, and, if 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 See Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624–25 (6th 
Cir. 2000). 
113 See id. at 625; accord Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that while an M&M dressed as a naked cowboy in 
Times Square evokes the character of the Naked Cowboy portrayed by Burck it 
does not evoke Burck himself, and therefore does not violate New York’s right 
of publicity law). Contra White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 
1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding a robot that looks like Vanna White violated her 
rights of publicity). 
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so, whether copyright in that character has been infringed.114 The 
court may examine the similarities between the specific aspects of 
the characters in dispute,115 or between the totality of the 
characters’ look and feel,116 or it may engage in combination of the 
foregoing.117 Because stock character traits are not 
copyrightable,118 some courts will distill the generic, unprotectable 
elements from a character before making a comparison to an 
allegedly infringing character.119 
Under the “abstraction/filtration” test, even if a character is 
original, its unique features must outweigh its stock characteristics 
to withstand the scrutiny of a comparison of protectable elements 
in an infringement action.120 Before the court compares the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 See 1–2 NIMMER, supra note 42, at § 2.12 (explaining that the 
copyrightability of characters is “more properly framed as relating to the degree 
of substantial similarity required to constitute infringement rather than in terms 
of copyrightability per se”). But see Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate Ltd., 988 F. 
Supp. 2d 879, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2013) aff’d, 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2013) (seeking 
declaratory judgment); Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986), vacated by 870 F.2d 40 (2d. Cir. 1989) (seeking declaratory judgment).  
115 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(abstraction/filtration test). 
116 See Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d 1157 at 1164 (extrinsic/intrinsic test). 
117 See Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298 at 309–10. 
118 Walker v. Viacom Intern. Inc., 2008 WL 2050964, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (“the similarities between the two characters are limited to the stock 
elements used to humanize a sponge”). 
119 This method employs the “abstraction/filtration” test famously set forth 
by Judge Hand in Nichols:  
“Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number 
of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as 
more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps 
be no more than the most general statement of what the play is 
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a 
point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer 
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the 
use of his ideas . . . .” 
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (internal quotation omitted).  
120 See id. (discussing abstraction/filtration test). 
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substantial similarity between two characters, it must first remove 
from each character all unprotectable ideas and themes, so that it 
can compare only the protectable components of each character.121 
Even if one party’s character contains original stylistic choices, 
those characteristics must be enhanced significantly to warrant 
copyright protection after the unprotectable elements have been 
filtered.122 In Mattel v. MGA, the court analyzed the substantial 
similarity between defendants’ Bratz dolls, and the doll sketches 
and sculptures owned by plaintiff.123 The appeals court held that 
the district court’s filtration of unprotectable elements was 
insufficient, and that it had erred by actually comparing similarities 
between non-protectable ideas.124 Upon further filtering of themes 
and ideas, the appeals court held that no reasonable trier of fact 
could find the characters substantially similar if they were only 
looking at the protectable expression.125 
In determining whether one character infringes the copyright of 
another, some courts not only look at the specific traits of each 
character, but also consider the overall look and feel and the total 
expression of character elements such as background story, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 See Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir. 2012); Mattel Inc. 
v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 916 (9th Cir. 2010); Original Appalachian 
Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 1982).  
122 Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1200–01(stick figures engaging in commonplace 
activities); Scholastic, Inc. v. Spiers, 28 F. Supp. 2d 862, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(skeleton wearing sneakers and a cap). 
123 Mattel, 616 F.3d 904. 
124 Id. at 916 (“[A plaintiff] can’t claim a monopoly over fashion dolls with 
a bratty look or attitude, or dolls sporting trendy clothing—these are 
unprotectable ideas.”); see also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. 
Mills Fun Grp. Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“The defendants 
have no more right to a monopoly in the theme of a black-robed, helmeted, evil 
figure in outer-space conflict with a humanoid and a smaller non-humanoid 
robot than Shakespeare would have had in the theme of a ‘riotous knight who 
kept wassail to the discomfort of the household’ . . . .”) (quoting Nichols, 45 
F.2d at 121). 
125 See Mattel, 616 F.3d at 917. 
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personality attributes, and interaction with other characters.126 In 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonalds Corp., 
the defendant attempted to dissect each trait—clothing, colors, 
mannerism, speech—comprising its character, and compare it to a 
corresponding trait in the plaintiff’s character, to conclude that 
because each individual trait was not exactly copied by its 
character, there was no infringement.127 The court rejected this 
argument, taking the position that the characters must be compared 
with respect to the overall look and feel in the context of the works 
in which they appear.128 In a case comparing the “Superman” 
character to a character appearing in the episodic television show, 
The Greatest American Hero, the Warner Bros., Inc. v. American 
Broadcasting Cos. court articulated its rationale for comparing the 
overall look and feel of the characters by distinguishing the 
analysis of literary characters from visual characters.129 Unlike a 
literary work, it reasoned, a graphic or three-dimensional work “is 
created to be perceived as an entirety.”130 What the character 
thinks, feels, says, and does, and the descriptions conveyed by the 
author through the comments of other characters in the work 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 This method employs the “extrinsic/intrinsic test” set forth in Sid & 
Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 1977) (“The test for similarity of ideas is still a factual one, to be 
decided by the trier of fact. . . . We shall call this the ‘extrinsic test.’ . . . The test 
to be applied in determining whether there is substantial similarity in 
expressions shall be labeled an intrinsic one depending on the response of the 
ordinary reasonable person.”) (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at 1166–67 (rebuking defendant’s analysis with “[w]e do not believe 
that the ordinary reasonable person, let alone a child, viewing these works will 
even notice that Pufnstuf is wearing a cummerbund while Mayor McCheese is 
wearing a diplomat’s sash.”). 
128 See id. at 1167. But see Am. Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 
579 F. Supp. 607, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that defendant’s bears do not 
appropriate the look and feel of plaintiff’s bears). 
129 See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239–45 (2d 
Cir. 1983).  
130 Id. at 241.  
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episodically, fill out a viewer’s understanding of the character.131 
Noting that “[s]tirring one’s memory of a copyrighted character is 
not the same as appearing to be substantially similar to that 
character,” defendant’s “Hinkley” character, in the context of the 
television show in which he appeared, was so different from 
Superman that no infringement could be found.132 In Hogan v. DC 
Comics, the court agreed with the defendant’s position that “the 
works must share a similarity of expression, such as similarities of 
treatment, details, scenes, events and characterization, or a 
similarity in their ‘total concept and feel.’”133 The court found that 
even though the main characters in both works had the same name, 
the similarities between these characters were mostly unprotectable 
ideas, such as their half-human/half-vampire genealogy, their 
struggles with good and evil, and their “Generation X” 
appearance.134 Furthermore, the total concept and feel of the 
characters was not substantially similar, as they had very different 
interactions and personalities.135A character owner cannot stop all 
uses of traits that merely remind the public of the proprietary 
character; only those instances where the traits used are 
substantially similar to the protectable features of the proprietary 
character.  
B. Non-infringing Uses—Trademark 
Trademark infringement involves the use of mark in a way that 
is likely to confuse consumers as to the source or origin of a 
product.136 Accordingly, where there is no substantial similarity 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 Id. at 241–42. 
132 Id. at 243 (“The total perception of the Hinkley character is not 
substantially similar to that of Superman. On the contrary, it is profoundly 
different.”). 
133 Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(citations omitted).  
134 Id. at 310–12.  
135 Id. at 312–13. 
136 See, e.g., Conan Props., Inc. v. Conans Pizza, 752 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 
1985); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 211 (2d. Cir. 
!
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between an allegedly infringing character and a plaintiff’s 
character from a copyright perspective, it is likely that potential 
confusion under trademark law also will not be found.137 In 
addition, trademarks can be used by others if the marks are not 
being used as a source identifier. In the long-running case of 
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., the court ultimately held 
that the use of the “Betty Boop” name in connection with the sale 
of merchandise incorporating public domain images of that 
character did not constitute trademark infringement because the 
defendants’ use was a non-trademark use.138 Both the Ninth Circuit 
and the district court on remand held that the use of the name by 
the defendants was an aesthetically functional use, meaning that 
consumers bought the Betty Boop merchandise because of the 
decorative function of the “Betty Boop” name.139 The district court 
reasoned that because the name was adapted from public domain 
posters in a way that made it a “decorative component and part of 
the aesthetic design of the defendant’s goods,” the purpose of the 
use of the name was to look aesthetically pleasing to potential 
customers, not to identify a source.140 On remand, the district court 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1981); Wyatt Earp Enters., Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621, 626 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
137 Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Companies, 720 F.2d 231, 246 
(2d Cir. 1983) (noting “[o]ur discussion of the differences in ‘total concept and 
feel’ of the central characters of Superman and Hinkley applies to the issue of 
likelihood of confusion as well as to copyright infringement.”); American 
Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 
see also Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding look and feel of plaintiff’s “Ghastly Trio” not 
infringed by defendant’s “Ghostbusters” logo). 
138 Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 
2012) (“Fleischer II”). 
139 Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir, 2011) 
(“Fleischer I”); Fleischer II at 1067. 
140 Fleischer II, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. While Fleischer I was withdrawn 
and superseded by Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 
2011) on remand, the district court in Fleischer II held defendants’ use of the 
word mark was aesthetically functional. 
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also held in the alternative that the defendants’ use of the “Betty 
Boop” name on their products was fair use, because it was not 
being used to identify the source of the goods, but merely to name 
the character.141 The court reasoned that the manner in which the 
defendants used the words was descriptive and therefore 
“otherwise than as a mark” pursuant to the Lanham Act.142 
To retain trademark rights in a character or its indicia, the 
owner of the trademark must continue to use that trademark in 
commerce. A character owner may therefore lose its exclusive 
trademark rights in a character or any of that character’s indicia if 
it abandons the mark.143 Pursuant to the Lanham Act, three years 
of non-use of a trademark with “intent not to resume” use is prima 
facie evidence of trademark abandonment.144 The burden is on the 
alleged mark owner to produce evidence that it used the mark 
during that time period, or that it intends to resume use.145 In Crash 
Dummy Movie v. Mattel Inc, the court found that Mattel had met 
its burden of demonstrating its intent to use its “Crash Dummies” 
mark, despite three years of non-use, by providing evidence of 
discussions with a prospective distributor, ongoing research and 
development into future toys using the mark, and evidence of 
shipments of sample toys for research and development 
purposes.146 In contrast, the former owners of the “Amos ‘n’ 
Andy” mark were unable to overcome the presumption of 
abandonment when they had not used the mark for over twenty 
years, and could not show any intent to revive its use.147 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Fleischer II, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. 
142 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)). 
143 See Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Silverman v. CBS, 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989).  
144 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“Nonuse [of a trademark] for 3 consecutive 
years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.”).  
145 Id. 
146 Crash Dummy Movie, 601 F.3d at 1391. 
147 Silverman, 870 F.2d at 48. 
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It is important to keep in mind, however, that regardless of 
whether confusion is likely, the owner of trademark elements of a 
character can separately maintain an action for trademark dilution. 
Trademark dilution can occur where a latter party’s use of a 
character or character indicia is the same or so similar to a famous 
mark already in use by another party that its use would dilute or 
weaken the distinctive value of the senior user’s mark.148 For 
example, in the “Arthur the Aardvark” costume case, the plaintiff 
was entitled to the injunction because if the defendants used their 
confusingly similar “Arthur” costume in connection with 
“unwholesome causes, . . . the image sought by the plaintiffs for 
Arthur will be difficult to control and might easily become blurred 
or tarnished, resulting in a loss of credibility, public affection, and 
consumer interest.149 In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. 
Pussycat Cinemas, Ltd., the appeals court upheld the district 
court’s injunction against defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
trademarked cheerleader outfit on actors in its “sexually depraved” 
film on the basis that such use tarnishes the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders brand.150 
C. Copyright Fair Use 
 The fair use doctrine, codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, 
significantly limits character owners’ exclusive rights.151 A new 
creator’s use of another’s character in a new work will not 
constitute infringement if the use falls within the parameters of fair 
use. Fair use protects free speech by permitting use of another’s 
copyrighted work for “purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C) (2012); see Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
149 See Brown v. It’s Entm’t, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
150 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinemas, Ltd., 604 F.2d 
200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) 
151 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 
F.3d 1257, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”152 Courts engage 
in a four-part inquiry to determine whether an unauthorized use of 
another’s copyrighted work is a “fair use” and therefore not an 
infringement.153 In recent years, some courts have put less 
emphasis on the four-factor fair use analysis and focused instead 
on whether the unauthorized use amounts to a “transformative” 
use—that is, a use that gives new message or meaning to the work 
used.154 
A common scenario in which the court analyzes whether the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s character is fair use occurs when 
the defendant claims it used plaintiff’s character for the purpose of 
parodying the character or the work in which it appeared.155 If a 
defendant successfully parodies a character, the “purpose and 
character of the use” is transformative and weighs heavily in favor 
of fair use.156 In the parody context, one issue is whether the 
defendant copied more than needed to “conjure up the original.”157 
The more famous the character is, the less that is needed.158 
Moreover, with visually represented characters, such as those in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
152 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
153 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); 
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 
F.3d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2010); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268. 
154 See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 
2013); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705–06 (2d Cir. 2013); Monge v. Maya 
Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1171–74 (9th Cir. 2012). 
155 17 U.S.C. § 107; see, e.g., Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 256; Suntrust 
Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268; Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 
(9th Cir. 1978); see also Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 388 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (holding defendant’s use of plaintiff’s “Barney the Dinosaur” 
character as a victim to its sports mascot was parody). 
156 See, e.g., Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 256; Mattel, Inc. v. Walking 
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank, 268 
F.3d at 1269. 
157 Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 757. 
158 See id. (recognizing that very little of the Mickey Mouse or Donald Duck 
characters need be used in the parodic work in order to put those characters in 
the viewer’s mind). 
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comic books, very little is needed for an effective parody.159 
Accordingly, in Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, defendant’s 
near exact replications of “Mickey Mouse” and “Donald Duck” 
constituted too much of a taking to warrant a fair use finding.160 
In Salinger v. Colting, the defendant argued that his 
appropriation of plaintiff’s Holden Caufield character was fair use 
because his book was a parody of The Catcher in the Rye.161 The 
court reasoned that merely rehashing the themes of plaintiff’s book 
with an aged version of the book’s protagonist was insufficient to 
demonstrate that the defendant had any intention to comment on or 
criticize that book or that character.162 Recognizing that a parodist 
must appropriate some amount of the existing work in order to 
comment upon it, the court warned: “If . . . the commentary has no 
critical bearing on the substance or style of the original 
composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get 
attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, 
the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes 
accordingly (if it does not vanish). . . .”163 In United Feature v. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
159 See id.; see also Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 
2d 897, 900–01 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (denying preliminary injunction against 
defendant’s pornographic film parodying Star Wars). 
160 Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 757; see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air 
Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (“It can scarcely be maintained 
that there is no other means available to defendants to convey the message they 
have, nor is it even clear that other means are not available within the chosen 
genre of comics and cartoons.”). 
161 See Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 
at 73 (2d Cir. 2010). The court did note that while a work need not be labeled a 
parody to be treated as one, a defendant cannot “post hoc” seek to characterize 
his potentially infringing work as a parody to avoid liability. Id. at 260 (citing 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 600 (1994)). There was evidence in this 
case that prior to the commencement of the infringement action against him, the 
defendant author had characterized his book as a sequel or tribute to The 
Catcher in the Rye. Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 260 n.3. 
162 Id. at 260. 
163 Id. at 257 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581). 
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Koons, the court held that Jeff Koons’ appropriation of plaintiff’s 
“Odie” character was infringing.164 There the court reasoned that 
defendant’s sculpture of “Odie” (from “Garfield”) was not an 
effective parody because Koons admittedly selected the “Odie” 
character arbitrarily, and not with the purpose of commenting on 
the character itself—demonstrating that at best, the work was a 
“parody of society at large . . .”165 Moreover, because the 
defendant copied plaintiff’s “Odie” character in its entirety and 
nearly identically, and he was found to have no motivation in 
creating the Odie sculpture other than to sell it, the court rejected 
Koons’ fair use defense.166 
In contrast to Salinger v. Colting, the court in Suntrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co. held that the author of a book entitled The 
Wind Done Gone made fair use of the classic novel, Gone with the 
Wind.167 The defendant, publisher of The Wind Done Gone, argued 
that it should not be enjoined from publishing the book because the 
book was a fair use parody criticizing slavery, the Civil War-era 
south, and the characters in Gone with the Wind.168 The court 
analyzed the manner in which the author of The Wind Done Gone 
used the characters from Gone with the Wind and concluded that 
she made fair use of those characters.169 Applying the four factors 
to the facts at bar, the court found: (1) the use was commercial in 
the sense that it was written for-profit, but because it was highly 
transformative, factor one weighed in favor of fair use;170 (2) Gone 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
164 United Feature Syndicate v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 384–85 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
165 Id. at 383–84. 
166 See id. at 384. 
167 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 628 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 1267–76 (11th Cir. 2001). But see Toho Co., Ltd. v. William 
Morrow & Co., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216–18 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (applying 
the four factor test and concluding defendant’s use of stills of plaintiff’s 
copyrighted Godzilla films in his compendium not fair use). 
170 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269–71. 
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with the Wind was entitled to “the greatest degree of copyright 
protection” as an original work of fiction;171 (3) the defendant took 
a substantial portion of plaintiff’s characters but that alone was not 
dispositive;172 and (4) the parodic nature of the defendant’s work 
indicated that it would not act as a substitute for the plaintiff’s 
work.173 For these reasons the court held that The Wind Done Gone 
did not infringe Gone with the Wind. 
Another fair use of a proprietary character was found in the 
case of Mattel v. Walking Mountain.174 There, the defendant 
photographer created and photographed scenes comprised of 
“carefully positioned, nude, and sometimes frazzled looking 
Barbies in often ridiculous and apparently dangerous situations.”175 
Mattel sued him for, inter alia, copyright infringement. The 
photographer argued that the purpose of his photographs was to 
criticize society’s objectification of women, which was 
exemplified by the popularity of the Barbie doll.176 After 
addressing each of the fair use factors, the court concluded that the 
defendant’s use of the Barbie character was fair use because: “(1) 
his use was parody meant to criticize Barbie, (2) he only copied 
what was necessary for his purpose, and (3) his photographs could 
not affect the market for Mattel’s products. . . .”177 Even the use of 
famous proprietary characters in their entirety will be permissible 
where the use is fair pursuant to the Copyright Act. 
D. Literary Works in the Public Domain 
But characters will not remain proprietary forever. Characters, 
like all copyrighted works, will be entitled to copyright protection 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 Id. at 1271. 
172 Id. at 1272–74. 
173 Id. at 1275–76. 
174 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
175 Id. at 802. 
176 See id. at 796. 
177 Id. at 800. 
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only for the applicable term of copyright. Once the copyright in the 
work in which a character appears expires—whether it be a book, a 
play, a radio program, a movie or otherwise—that character, as 
depicted in that work, enters the public domain. The extent to 
which later published works featuring the same character include 
further protectable development of the character will determine 
whether and to what extent the owner retains exclusive right to use 
the character. Where a character appears in a series of works over 
time, inevitably, at some point, the earliest of the works will enter 
the public domain while others remain protected by copyright. In 
this situation, a character can exist in two or more incarnations, 
some of which may enter the public domain, while others remain 
protected. Courts have held that where an author has used a 
character in a series of works, and any of those have entered the 
public domain, anyone can use the story and character elements 
from the works that have entered the public domain.178 
In a case involving characters appearing in a radio series, 
Silverman v. CBS, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that 
the “Amos ‘n’ Andy” characters were in the public domain so he 
could use them in his original musical.179 The court had to consider 
the many appearances of “Amos ‘n’ Andy” over time, first via 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 889 (N.D. Ill. 
2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2013); see Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 
40 (2d Cir. 1989); Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable, No. 03 Civ. 7841 
(NRB), 2004 WL 1276842 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2004), aff’d in part, 426 F.3d 650 
(2d Cir. 2005); see also Siegel v. Warner Bros Entm’t, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 
1048, 1059 (“Subsequent works in a series (or sequels) are in a sense derivative 
works, while the characters which appear throughout the series are a part of the 
underlying [initial] work upon which the later works are based . . . . So 
copyright in a particular work in a series will not protect the character as 
contained in such series if the work in the series in which the character first 
appeared has entered the public domain[; instead,] protection for the character 
extends only to those . . . elements added in [the sequel].”) (quoting 1 NIMMER, 
supra note 42, at § 2.12 at 2–178.31 to –178.32). 
179 Silverman, 870 F.2d at 42 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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radio programs, and later on television.180 Because the facts 
showed that the pre-1948 radio scripts—in which the characters 
first appeared and were sufficiently delineated—had entered the 
public domain, the court found that the “Amos ‘n’ Andy” 
characters as they appeared in those pre-1948 scripts were in the 
public domain.181 However, CBS still owned the increments of 
original expression that appeared in the later, derivative works, 
even if some of that original expression further developed the 
characters.182 It was this later-created expression that Silverman 
was precluded from using.183 Silverman was therefore allowed to 
use the “Amos ‘n’ Andy” characters, so long as they didn’t display 
any traits first appearing after 1948.184  
 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate was another declaratory 
judgment action by a plaintiff who desired to use characters 
purportedly owned by the defendants in his original work.185 
Sherlock Holmes and John Watson appeared in four novels and 
fifty-six stories, only the last ten of which remained protected by 
copyright at the time of the litigation.186 The author’s estate argued 
that because the characters were developed throughout the entire 
canon, including the last ten stories still protected by copyright, the 
characters remained protected by the estate’s copyrights in those 
last ten stories.187 Both the district court and the appeals court 
rejected that argument, holding that the characters were delineated 
upon their first appearance in the first novel, and that all 
subsequent novels and stories containing the characters were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
180 See id. at 43. 
181 Id. at 50. 
182 See id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882 (N.D. 
Ill. 2013). 
186 See id. at 892. 
187 Id. at 888. 
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derivative works.188 Applying the “increments of expression” 
doctrine to the derivative works, the Seventh Circuit did find, 
however, that even though the characters themselves were in the 
public domain, the estate still owned the original expression added 
to the characters in those last ten stories, precluding Klinger’s use 
of those elements.189  
Thus, new creators can take characters from the public domain, 
add new creative elements to those characters, and in effect bring 
their versions of those characters to copyright life—as Universal 
Pictures did with Mary Shelley’s “Frankenstein” and Bram 
Stoker’s “Dracula,” and Disney did with the Brothers’ Grimm 
“Snow White,” “Cinderella,” and “Rapunzel.” 190 The new creative 
elements will be protected by copyright as long as they do not 
infringe upon any creative elements that remain protected by 
copyright by a prior user.191  
E. Visual Images in the Public Domain 
Another situation in which a character owner’s exclusive rights 
may be tempered arises where a work that contains visual images 
of that character has entered the public domain. In Warner 
Brothers v. X one X Productions, the plaintiffs challenged the 
defendant’s right to create and sell merchandise derived from 
publicity shots and posters from the The Wizard of Oz and Gone 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188 See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 
2014) (“From the outset of the series of Arthur Conan Doyle stories and novels 
that began in 1887 Holmes and Watson were distinctive characters and therefore 
copyrightable.”). 
189 Id. at 501. 
190 See M.H. Segan Ltd. Partnership v. Hasbro, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 512 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (accepting as true that MCA/Universal Merchandising, Inc. 
owns the copyright in the visual image of the Frankenstein character); see also 
Sleeping Beauty, The Little Mermaid, Aladdin, and Pinocchio. 
191 Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 586 (8th 
Cir. 2011). (“[T]his freedom to make new works based on public domain 
materials ends where the resulting derivative work comes into conflict with a 
valid copyright.”). 
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with the Wind films.192 The defendant argued that because its 
merchandise used only public domain images, as opposed to stills 
from the actual films, it was not infringing on the plaintiff’s 
copyrights in the films.193 The posters and still images were in the 
public domain because they were published without complying 
with then-required copyright formalities such as including 
copyright notice or filing copyright renewals.194 Analyzing the 
attributes of the characters in the public domain publicity 
materials, and those embodied by the films, the court reasoned that 
because the publicity materials “reveal[ed] nothing of each film 
character’s signature traits or mannerisms,”195 and because “the 
characters’ visual appearances in the publicity materials for The 
Wizard of Oz do not present the requisite consistency to establish 
any ‘copyrightable elements’ of the film characters’ visual 
appearances,” even if those images were in the public domain, the 
characters in the films were not.196 Therefore, the defendant was 
only permitted to faithfully reproduce the public domain images on 
merchandise because those particular images, in contrast to the 
characters depicted in those images, were in the public domain. 
The defendant was precluded from extracting the images of the 
characters from the public domain works in which they appeared 
and creating new composite works featuring the characters and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
192 Id. at 584. 
193 See id. at 596. 
194 See id. at 597–98. 
195 Id. at 599. 
196 Id. at 602 (“[A]lthough the derivative work may enter the public domain, 
the matter contained therein which derives from a work still covered by statutory 
copyright is not dedicated to the public. The established doctrine prevents 
unauthorized copying or other infringing use of the underlying work or any part 
of that work contained in the derivative product so long as the underlying work 
itself remains copyrighted.”) (quoting Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th 
Cir. 1979)); see also Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., 772 F. Supp. 2d 
1135, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[E]ven if the poster did fall into the public 
domain as a result of the lack of a copyright notice, the original Betty Boop 
character that is a component part of the pre–July–1931 cartoon films did not.”). 
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their famous maxims (such as “There’s no place like home”), 
because such new composite works would “evoke the film 
character in a way the individual items of public domain material 
did not,” even if each composite work was “composed entirely of 
faithful extracts from public domain materials.”197 The 
combination of the images and aphorisms, the court held, added 
the increments of expression required to infringe upon the more 
developed film characters.198  
In contrast to the above-cited cases in which the seminal works 
embodying the character remained protected by copyright, the 
purported owners of the “Fatso” the ghost character (a friend of 
“Casper the Friendly Ghost”) were unable to sustain a copyright 
infringement claim against the producers of the Ghostbusters film 
for use of a ghost image in their marketing, because the early 
“Casper” cartoons in which “Fatso” appeared had entered the 
public domain.199 Because “Fatso” appeared in later “Casper” 
episodes identical to the way he appeared in public domain 
episodes, he had entered the public domain when those early 
episodes did.200  
The fact that the copyright in a visual image of character has 
fallen into the public domain does not mean that the character, or 
elements of the character, may not still function as a trademark.201 
For instance, the plaintiff in Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, 
Inc. conceded that the pictures on the covers of the books that were 
the subject of the litigation were in the public domain, but argued 
that those same illustrations had acquired secondary meaning and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
197 Warner Bros., 644 F.3d at 602–03. 
198 Id. at 600. 
199 Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564, 
1570 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
200 See id. 
201 See, e.g., Tri-star Pictures, Inc. v. Del Taco, Inc., 1999 WL 33260839 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1999); Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. 
Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).  
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functioned as trademarks.202 Noting that copyright law and 
trademark law were not mutually exclusive means to protect a 
character, the court in Warne held that even if the illustrations had 
fallen into the public domain, an illustration could be protected by 
trademark law “so long as it is shown to have acquired 
independent trademark significance, identifying in some way the 
source or sponsorship of the goods.”203 It is on this same basis that 
the producer of the 1998 The Mask of Zorro movie was able to 
assert its trademark rights in the Zorro character to prevent a 
restaurant chain from adopting Zorro indicia in an advertising 
campaign.204 
F.  The First Amendment 
Free speech rights will allow the use of another’s trademark in 
the title of a creative work where the mark is used for creative 
expression and not primarily for a commercial purpose.205 In a case 
whose rule has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit and applied to 
character cases, the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi held 
there was no Lanham Act violation for false designation of origin 
where the defendant filmmaker used the famous plaintiff’s name in 
the title of his film, Ginger and Fred.206 With respect to this type 
of use of a mark or persona, the defendant’s freedom of expression 
outweighed the plaintiff’s concern that the title would mislead 
consumers.207 Adopting the Second Circuit’s “Rogers test” in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
202 See Frederick, 481 F. Supp. at 1193. 
203 Id. at 1196. In this case, however, plaintiff had not provided sufficient 
evidence of this claim to be granted summary judgment of the issue. Id. at 1198.  
204 See Tri-star, at *3. 
205 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989). See also 
Silverman, 870 F.2d at 48; Toho Co., Ltd. v. William Morrow & Co. 33 F. Supp. 
2d 1206, 1212 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding defendant’s use of “Godzilla” as the 
title of his books about the character likely to confuse consumers as to source of 
book). 
206 See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997–1002. 
207 See id. at 1001. See also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 
894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Limited to this core purpose—avoiding confusion in 
!
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Mattel v. MCA, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
district court’s ruling that the band Aqua’s song “Barbie Girl” did 
not infringe Mattel’s trademark rights in the Barbie name.208 
Cautioning that “the trademark owner does not have the right to 
control public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with 
a meaning beyond its source-identifying function,”209 the court 
held that using the Barbie trademark in a song making fun of the 
values Barbie represents was artistically relevant and did not 
suggest that the song was sponsored by Mattel.210 When Mattel 
returned to the same court shortly thereafter in Mattel v. Walking 
Mountain for the same First Amendment reasons, the court easily 
found that the defendant’s use of the Barbie name in the titles of 
his photographs depicting Barbies was artistic expression 
accurately describing the subject of the photos and not suggesting 
that Mattel was in any way connected to the photographs.211  
Similarly, claims for violations of rights of publicity may be 
rejected on First Amendment grounds. For example, the 
“transformative test” articulated in Comedy III Productions v. 
Gary Saderup, sets forth the rule that where a depiction of a 
celebrity is significantly transformed by the addition of increments 
of expression to his mere likeness, no violation of his right to 
publicity will occur, and the user’s First Amendment rights will be 
maintained.212 In that case, the court averred that whether the use 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the marketplace—a trademark owner’s property rights play well with the First 
Amendment.”). 
208 296 F.3d at 909 (“I’m a Barbie girl, in my Barbie world; Life in plastic, 
it’s fantastic.”). 
209 Id. at 900. 
210 Id. at 902. 
211 353 F.3d. 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003). 
212 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001); see No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, 
Inc., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1728, 1740 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding Avatars 
representing the band No Doubt in Activision’s game did not meet the 
transformative-use test because the avatars were simply “precise computer-
generated reproductions of the band members” which did not “meld with the 
!
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of celebrities’ likenesses (in this case, the “Three Stooges” on t-
shirts) violates their rights of publicity or is protected First 
Amendment expression depends upon “whether the celebrities’ 
likenesses are used as one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an 
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation 
of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in 
question.”213 The analysis thus turns on whether a product 
containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has 
become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the 
celebrity’s likeness. 
Accordingly, the court in Edgar Winter v. DC Comics held that 
use of celebrities’ likenesses as some of the raw materials 
comprising a comic book story does not violate the celebrities’ 
rights of publicity where the depictions are transformative—that is, 
where the depictions contain significant expressive content other 
than the celebrities’ mere likenesses.214 The expressive content in 
that case included use of the likenesses in a larger story, which 
itself was quite expressive, as well as distortion, lampooning, 
parody, and caricature.215  
Rejecting the “transformative test,” the court in Doe v. 
MacFarlane adopted a “predominant use test” when balancing a 
celebrity’s right of publicity against freedom of speech rights.216 
Notwithstanding the expressiveness of the use of the identity, if a 
product is sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value 
of an individual’s identity, that product should be held to violate 
the right of publicity and not be protected by the First Amendment, 
even if there is some “expressive” content in it that might qualify 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
other elements of the game to become . . . Activision’s own artistic 
expression.”). 
213 Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 809. 
214 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003). 
215 See id. 
216 207 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
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as “speech.”217 If, on the other hand, the predominant purpose of 
the product is to make an expressive comment on or about a 
celebrity, the expressive additions could be given greater weight.218 
In Doe v. MacFarlane, the court held that the use of the name 
“Tony Twist,” a former professional hockey player, as the name of 
a mobster in a comic book series violated the player’s right of 
publicity because the evidence demonstrated that the predominant 
use of Twist’s name was to sell comic books and appeal to hockey 
fans.219 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Trademark, copyright, and rights of publicity laws encourage 
authors to conceive and develop original fictional characters and 
offer them to the public to enjoy in various forms of media and 
merchandise. The laws also protect the public and other authors by 
denying the creators and owners of original characters the ability to 
maintain monopolies over their characters by limiting the scope of 
exclusive protection available to characters.  
Understanding what makes characters protectable will provide 
an author the opportunity to conceive and develop characters in a 
way that will enhance their protectability. Fully fleshing out one’s 
characters by including distinctive tangible and intangible traits—
including physical appearance; clothing or (if applicable) costume; 
personality traits; powers; habits; manner of speech; origin and 
background story; interaction and relationships with other 
characters; and settings in which the character exists—will all 
increase the scope of protection afforded to such character under 
copyright whether in literary or visual imagery or both.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
217 Id. at 57 (quoting Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 
2003)).  
218 Id. 
219 See id. at 61. 
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Giving a character a distinctive and memorable name and using 
that name in or as a series title and otherwise for the branding of 
publications, media productions, and merchandise will help the 
character creator establish trademark rights in the character name. 
This also applies to symbols, emblems, slogans, and visual 
imagery of or elements associated with the character. To establish 
and maintain trademark rights in elements associated with one’s 
character, it is important to use those elements in a consistent 
manner. Character creators seeking to further their rights in their 
characters may secure trademark registrations and domain names 
based on their characters’ names, and terms or slogans associated 
with their characters. But while trademark law rewards the entity 
that expended the time and money to develop a character so that 
the consuming public identifies it with that entity, those exclusive 
rights are subject to limitations. Character marks must be 
consistently used in commerce, and trademark rights cannot be 
used to prevent others from using characters that have fallen into 
the public domain, so long as the latter users of such characters use 
them in a manner that will not confuse the public as to the source 
of the latter users’ works. 
Notwithstanding the effort devoted to creating a protectable 
character, authors and their successors in interest should 
understand, however, that eventually the copyright in an original 
character will expire, thereby dedicating even a highly delineated 
and unique character to the public after some period of time. A 
character owner can keep a character fresh and alive by adding 
updates to keep the character current with the time, adding new 
traits, modifying the character’s appearance, and introducing new 
supporting characters and elements. So, while the earliest versions 
of a character may enter the public domain, the original character 
owner or successor thereto can maintain itself in the public eye as 
the source of the official version of character.  
Allowing creators and their assignees to exploit their characters 
through copyright, trademark, and right of publicity on an 
exclusive basis—subject to certain limited exceptions—encourages 
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authors, artists, and performers to add to the culture that benefits 
all of society. By giving character owners confidence that others 
cannot unfairly trade off their original work and the good will they 
have generated in connection with their characters, character 
owners will be encouraged to spend time and money developing 
the public’s favorite characters. If so incentivized, the owners will 
invest in producing more entertainment products containing those 
characters for the public to enjoy. Exclusive rights in characters 
also benefit the public in that encouraging owners to produce more 
character entertainment products ensures that the owners will 
maintain the quality of the entertainment product, continuing to 
meet consumers’ high expectations for the products.  
The exceptions to exclusive use discussed above put reasonable 
limitations on a character owner’s monopoly over a piece of our 
collective culture. Trademark law will only protect a character for 
so long as the owner is using the mark in commerce. Therefore, in 
order to maintain such exclusivity, owners must provide the public 
with entertainment products containing those characters. If an 
owner does abandon its trademark rights in a character, then any 
member of the public has a right to use whatever previously 
trademark-protected elements of the character they desire to keep 
the character alive. When the copyright in a character expires, any 
member of the public has the right to create original works using 
that character. If such a second comer desires to establish exclusive 
rights in a new version of the character, the second comer must add 
original creativity to the public domain character. This, in turn, 
will benefit the public by advancing the number and variety of 
works generated for public enjoyment. In addition, the First 
Amendment keeps character owners from extending their 
monopolies unconstitutionally by restricting owners from 
controlling public discourse, even when their proprietary 
characters are used. A robust public discourse is also encouraged 
by the allowance for use of protected characters for purposes such 
as parody and criticism. In these ways, the law endeavors to 
balance the exclusivity that owners deserve for adding desirable 
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characters to our shared culture, with the societal goals of 
encouraging the dissemination of creative works and public 
discourse by using culturally relevant characters in new works.  
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